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PROBLEMS FOR THE COVERING-LAW MODEL OF EXPLANATION 
Eric Russert Kraemer 
Department of Philosophy 
University of Nebraska-Lincoln 
Lincoln, Nebraska 68588 
The standard covering-law model of explanation sets forth a for-
mal, deductive account of explanation. The account faces two kinds of 
formal objections. The fust is the problem of explanatory relevance. 
This concerns the specification of formal conditions for relevant logi-
cal derivations. The second difficulty is the problem of "self" -explana-
tion. This involves specifications which govern the role that a given 
statement is allowed to play in an explanatory deduction of itself. 
A revision of the standard covering-law model provides a natural way 
to avoid both of these problems. And, it also has the virtue of not 
being an ad hoc solution. 
t t t 
INTRODUCTION 
The deductive-nomological (DN) or covering-law model 
:"or the explanation of singular events has come under exten-
sive criticism. This article attempts to defend this model from 
·everal of the charges that have been made against it and shows 
'hat these criticisms may be accommodated by reasonable 
"dditions to the model. The criticism that this model is insuf-
Hcient for scientific explanation of singular events is ques-
tioned. (It is not argued here that all explanations fit the DN-
Llodel.) 
Two formal sorts of criticisms of the DN-model for the 
,'xplanation of singular events are considered. The first of 
1 hese is called the problem of relevance, the second, the prob-
km of "self' -explanation. 
THE PROBLEM 
OF RELEVANCE IN DN-EXPLANA TION 
In their classic discussion of the covering-law model, 
llempel and Oppenheim (1948) introduced something like the 
f·jllowing as a plausible definition of DN-explanation of 
smgular events: 
Definition (I): An ordered couple of sentences, 
(T,C), constitutes an explanans for a singular sentence 
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E iff. the following conditions are satisfied: (i) T 
is a theory, (ii) C is singular and true, and (iii) E is 
derivable from T and C jointly, but not from C 
alone. 
Although these authors abandoned this defmition for a more 
complicated one, definition (I) will be sufficient for illus-
trating the problem of relevance, one of two formal problems 
facing the DN-model. 
What is meant by the problem of relevance? Hempel 
(1966) answered when he listed the following as a "basic 
requirement for scientific explanation": 
The requirement of explanatory relevance: the ex-
planatory information adduced affords good grounds 
for believing that the phenomenon to be explained 
did, or does indeed occur. 
In a subsequent passage, Hempel made clear what the criteria 
are for the "good grounds" for belief afforded by DN-explan-
ation: 
DN-explanations satisfy the requirement of explan-
atory relevance in the strongest possible sense: the 
explanatory information they provide implies the 
explanadum sentence deductively and thus offers 
logically conclusive grounds why the explanandum 
phenomenon is to be expected. 
However, logical deducibility does not seem to be enough 
to insure that the requirement of explanatory relevance is met. 
Consider the following case: 
(1) All chickens have two legs. 
John Doe has as many legs as some chicken. 
John Doe has two legs. 
The conclusion of (1) follows deductively from the theory and 
initial conditions cited. But, there is something very odd about 
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a theory which deals with chickens claiming to give a scien-
tific explanation of John Doe's bipedal state. Clearly, the 
conclusion is irrelevant to the theory cited. Whether John Doe 
has two legs does not affect the theory that all chickens 
naturally do have two legs. 
Hempel's criterion for explanatory relevance as it stands 
above is inadequate. A suggestion for a better one comes 
from Hilpinen's (1971) discussion of the problem of relevance 
in epistemic justification. He remarked: 
If g is irrelevant to the justification of h, then h is 
justified no matter whether we assume that g or -g 
is true, that is, no matter whether g or -g is added to 
our original evidence e. 
In other words, if the conjunction of e and -g calls h into 
question, then g is relevant to the justification of h. 
To apply this suggestion to DN·explanation, let us substi· 
tute theories (Ts) for h's, sets of initial conditions (C's) for 
e's, and explananda (E's) for g's. A definition of the concept 
of a direct-singular contradiction is needed. 
D is a direct-singular contradiction of T = Df. (i) D 
is singular, and (ii) existential quantification over D 
may produce something logically equivalent to not T. 
For example, 'VFa is a direct-singular contradiction of (x)(Fx), 
since (Ex) (-Fx) is logically equivalent to -(x) (Fx). Similar-
ly, (Fa & -Ga) is a direct-singular contradiction of (x) (Fx~ 
Gx), since (ExXFx & -Gx) is logically equivalent to -(x) 
(Fx~x); but, [[(Fa~Ga)~Ha] & -Ha] is not a direct-singu-
lar contradiction of (x) (Fx~x), since even the most likely 
existential version of the former, namely (Ex) [[(Fx~x)~ 
Ha] & -Hx], is not logically equivalent to -(x) (Fx~Gx). 
Using this machinery, an appropriate modification of defini-
tion (I) to include only relevant DN-explanation is as follows: 
Definition (II): The ordered pair. (T,C), relevantly 
DN-explains E iff.: (i) T is a theory, (ii) C is singular 
and true, (iii) E is derivable from T and C jointly, 
but not from C alone, and (iv) (C & -E) is logically 
equivalent to a direct-singular contradiction of T. 
Definition (II) does not meet all formal difficulties, but it 
does accommodate many problem cases. Observe first how 
it fits the paradigm case of DN-explanation of singular events: 
(2) (x) (Fx~Gx) 
Fa 
Ga 
Since (Fa & -Ga) is a direct-singular contradiction of the 
theory cited in (2), namely (x) (Fx~x), by definition (II) 
case (2) is a relevant DN-explanation. The definition also 
excludes case (1) as irrelevant. Further, the definition also 
handles one of the cases which forced Hempel and Oppen-
heim to abandon defmition (I), namely: 
(3) (x) (Fx~x) 
(Fa~a)-+Ha 
Ha 
In this case, Ha is clearly irrelevantly deduced; and, definition 
(II) says just this. Not surprisingly, definition (II) also handles 
cases equivalent to (3), such as: 
(3') (x) (Fx~x) 
(Fa-+& -Ga) v Ha 
Ha 
Again, (C & -E) is not logically equivalent to a direct-singular 
contradiction of the theory cited. 
Although definition (II) accommodates many problem 
cases, it is not completely satisfactory, for it excludes in-
stances which should be allowed as perfectly acceptable DN-
explanations, such as: 
(2.1) (x) [(Fx v Gx)-+Hx] 
Fa 
Ha 
Here (Fa & -Ha) is not a direct-singular contradiction of the 
theory cited. To meet this objection, the concept of a trivial 
logical consequence (TLC) is introduced: 
P is a trivial-logical consequence of Q = Df. Either 
(i) Q is logically equivalent to a conjunction of which 
P is a conjunct, or (ii) P is logically equivalent to a 
disjunction of which Q is a disjunct. 
According to this definition, P is a TLC of (P & Q), (P v Q) is 
a TLC of P, and P is a TLC of P [since P is logically equiva-
lent both to (P & P) and to (P v P)]. 
Clause (iv) of Definition (II) may now be modified as 
follows: 
(iv') Either (C & -E) is logically equivalent to a 
direct-singular contradiction of T, or the conjunction 
of -E and a trivial-logical consequence of C is logical-
ly equivalent to a direct-singular contradiction of T. 
Since (Fa v Ga) is a TLC of Fa, and [(Fa v Ga) & -Ha] is a 
direct-Singular contradiction of (x) [(Fx v Gx~Ha], deduc-
tions such as (2.1) will be included as relevant DN-explana-
tions under this modification of definition (II). It might also 
be noted that deductions of the following sort are now in-
cluded as good DN-explanations according to this modifica-
tion: 
(2.2) (x) (Fx-+Gx) 
Fa&Ha 
Ga 
The sort of relevance discussed here differs from that 
mentioned by Hilpinen (1971) because the projects are dif-
ferent. Hilpinen (1971) was concerned with finding a means 
for picking out those items of evidence which are relevant to 
the justification of a given hypothesis, h, on a certain evidence 
base, e. I am concerned with finding a criterion for picking 
out those logical deductions which are relevant to a given 
theory being used explanatorily in accordance with the ON-
model. 
For Hilpinen (1971) there was no important restriction 
on the sort of thing to be considered for relevancy to the 
justification project. Whatever is such that either it or its nega-
tion affects the justification of h on e qualifies as relevant. 
With ON-explanation, however, there are two restrictions. 
First, in accordance with the basic gUidelines of the ON-model, 
only those events which follow logically from a given theory 
and set of initial conditions may be considered as prima facie 
candidates for relevantly explained explananda in terms of 
that theory. Secondly, not just any logical deduction will do. 
The task of this section has been to specify those deductions 
which actually fall within the province of the theory cited. 
If it is required only that (C & -E) entail a contradiction 
of the given theory, then, as demonstrated by cases (1), (3), 
and (3'), theories will be placed in the position of having to 
ON-explain events of a kind that are completely unrelated to 
those theories. If, on the other hand, the stronger require-
ment is demanded, that (C & -E) or (-E & a TLC of C) be a 
direct-singular contradiction of the theory cited, then it seems 
possible to limit the events that are ON-explainable by a given 
theory to those events of the kind mentioned in that theory. 
[his latter restriction does not seem to be merely an ad hoc 
maneuver. For it seems well in accordance with the rationale 
·)f scientific explanation to require that theories dealing with 
~vents of a given kind be able to ON-explain only particular 
,nstances of that kind. 
THE PROBLEM 
OF "SELF"-EXPLANATION 
Although irrelevant attempts at ON-explanation can be 
uccessfully accommodated by the modified version of defini-
..ion (II), there is another serious, formal problem facing ON-
,'xplanation, that of "self' -explanation. By "self' -explanation 
,s meant that the set of initial conditions (C) may contain 
ome part (or all) of the explanandum (E), and that part is 
. equired for the logical deduction of that part of the explan-
:tndum. According to Kim (1963), instances of partial "self'-
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explanation such as the following satisfy Hempel and Oppen· 
heim's definition (I): 
(4) (x) (Fx Gx) 
Fa&Ra 
Ga&Ra 
(4') (x) (Fx Gx) 
Fa & Ra 
Ta & (Ra v Ja) 
Both (4) and (4') are held to be irrelevant deduction by the 
modified clause (iv') of definition (II). 
"Self' -explanation seems completely foreign to the con-
cept of ON-explanation. For as Hempel and Oppenheim 
(1948) said, "Scientific explanation makes essential use of 
generalized sentences." Any instance of even partial essential 
"self' -explanation contradicts this maxim. This maxim is 
understood to say that the whole of an explanandum and not 
merely some proper part of it must be explained by making 
essential use of generalized sentences. For this reason it is 
somewhat disconcerting that in the same paper Hempel and 
Oppenheim stated: 
In every potential explanation in which the singular 
component of the explanans is not dispensible, the 
explanation is partly explained by itself. 
They based this claim on the logical fact that the paradigm 
case of ON-explanation of singular events, that is, case (2), 
may be rewritten in the following equivalent way: 
(2') (x) (-Fx v Gx) 
(Fa v Ga) & (Fa v -Ga) 
(Fa v Ga) & (-Fa v Ga) 
They continued that if (Fa v -Ga) is omitted from the initial 
conditions of (2'), then (2') is reduced to two parts: (i) an 
instance of theoretical explanation, (x) (-Fx v Gx) entailing 
(-Fa v Ga), and (ii) an instance of "self'-explanation, i.e., 
(Fa v Ga) entailing itself. On the basis of (2') they refrained 
from "introducing stipulations to prohibit partial self-explana-
tion" on the grounds that such prohibition would "mean 
limiting explanation to purely theoretical explanation." 
Hempel and Oppenheim's conclusions from (2') seem 
confused. The most that follows from (2') is that in every po-
tential explanation in which the singular component of the 
explanans is not dispensible, the explanandum may be inter-
preted as being partly explained by itself. However, the 
derivation in (2') does not require that some part of the 
explanandum be deduced from itself. For example, the initial 
conditions cited there may still be used to derive Fa; this, 
when combined with the theory (x) (-Fx v Gx), yields Ga, 
which in turn entails the explanandum given in (2'), without 
any "self' -explanation. Cases such as (2') do not necessitate 
the use of partial "self' -explanation, unlike cases such as (4) 
and (4'). 
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The DN-explanation schema given in (2') is perfectly 
acceptable. First, according to definition (II), (2') is a relevant 
deduction. Second, it should be pointed out that the predi-
cate G, which introduces the possibility of partial "self'-
explanation in C of (2'), occurs ir.essentially there. Following 
Kim (1963), the locution "A occurs in essentially in S" is used 
as follows: 
A occurs inessentially in S = Df. There exists a sen-
tence S' such that S' is logically equivalent to sentence 
S, and A does not occur in S'. 
Clearly the C of (2') can be rewritten in an equivalent form in 
which the predicate G does not appear, e.g., (Fa v Ha) & 
(Fa v -Ha). Since the explanation can be derived without any 
"self' -explanation, it is concluded that any partial "self'-
explanation that may occur in (2') is incidental, and not a 
necessary part of the deduction of the explanandum. 
Consider also what happens if (Fa v -Ga) is omitted from 
the C in (2') as Hempel and Oppenheim (1948) suggested. The 
argument then becomes: 
(2") (x) (-Fx v Gx) 
Fa vGa 
(Fa v Ga) & (-Fa v Ga) 
This attempt at DN-explanation will not satisfy the modified 
definition (II), for (2") cannot meet the relevancy require-
ment. 
Therefore, even though Hempel and Oppenheim thought 
it impossible to draw a non-arbitrary limit to partial "self'-
explanation, a natural line does exist between those cases in 
which some part (or all) of E occurs inessentially in C and 
those cases in which some part of E occurs essentially in C 
With this in mind, let us consider instances of relevant 
explanations which are also partial "self' -explanations. These 
are cases that, as Kim (1963) suggested, an adequate defini-
tion of DN-explanation should rule out. 
(5) (x) (Fx~Gx) 
Fa vGa 
Ga 
(5') (x) (Fx & Ix}+Gx) 
Fa vGa 
Ia 
Ga 
These two are not acceptable as instances of DN-explanation, 
since certain singular sentences of a particularly vicious sort, 
namely the explananda themselves, are essentially required 
in the logical deduction of the conclusion. 
These two cases make it clear that the modified definition 
(II) by itself cannot solve all problem cases. This is not too 
surprising, as the relevancy requirement by itself cannot ex-
clude the following: 
(6) (x) (Fx~Fx) 
Fa 
Fa 
Case (6) is, of course, dealt with by the second half of require-
ment (iii), namely "E does not follow from C alone." To 
accommodate cases such as (5) and (5'), the third requirement 
of definition (II) may be changed to the following: 
(iii') E is derivable from T and C jOintly and not 
from C alone, and C does not contain E essentially. 
This revision excludes (5) and (5'), for a part of E, namely E 
itself, is contained essentially in each set of initial conditions 
listed for these cases. 
The doubly amended version of definition (II) [here 
called definition (II')], which contains clauses (iii') and 
(iv'), limits DN-explanation to those cases which are both 
relevant and non-redundant. By "non-redundant" it is meant 
that no part of the logical derivation of the explanandum 
requires "self' -explanation. There is a powerful intuitive 
reason for this additional requirement: if a theory is not re-
quired for every part of the derivation, then the use of DN-
explanation, i.e., explanation by deduction from theories or 
laws of nature, is seriously compromised. Since requirement 
(iii') excludes all cases in which some form of "self'-explana-
tion is essential, this requirement seems clearly to be justified 
in Hempel's (1965) sense, "in terms of the rationale of scien-
tific explanation." 
SUMMARY 
Two formal problems that arise for the covering-law or 
DN-model of explanation are discussed. Means by which these 
problems seemingly can be met are suggested. It is demon-
strated that the solution is not ad hoc, but is motivated by 
sound intuitions. 
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